Os perigos de abraçar a Índia

Desde a visita do primeiro-ministro António Costa à Índia, em Janeiro de 2017, e da recente vinda do primeiro-ministro indiano Narendra Modi a Lisboa, têm surgido vários discursos celebratórios sobre a efetiva aproximação entre os dois países.

À superfície, estes discursos parecem trazer consigo a promessa de fortes e mutuamente respeitosas relações pós-coloniais. A realidade, porém, é bem mais inquietante. As novas relações que Portugal está a forjar com esta potência regional demonstram um profundo desconhecimento da natureza do Estado indiano. A antropóloga Shalini Randeria cunhou o termo ‘cunning state’ [Estado astuto] para definir a natureza da Índia, ou seja, a de um Estado que utiliza acontecimentos internacionais para fortalecer o seu poder tanto interna como externamente. De facto, a Índia, enquanto Estado astuto, manipulou Portugal e o seu primeiro-ministro, afirmando uma duvidosa e racializada leitura da história do subcontinente asiático, estrategicamente pensada para abrir caminho a uma nova ordem internacional — de carácter neo-colonial — que a Índia espera impor.

O desejo de se afirmar no plano global é uma ação legítima por parte de qualquer Estado. Mas a forma como a Índia opera é, por várias razões, altamente problemática. Uma análise cuidada da concessão do estatuto de Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) — Cidadão Ultramarino da Índia, um estatuto em princípio aberto a todos os estrangeiros com antepassados dentro das fronteiras da India actual — ilustra bem esta questão.

 

De facto, uma das principais razões para a recente visita de Costa à Índia foi este presidir ao 14.º Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Dia do Indiano no Exterior). Portugal cometeu o enorme equivoco de tratar este convite como uma oportunidade para obter acesso ao tão desejado mercado indiano. Muito pelo contrário, este convite foi um cavalo de Tróia deixado pela Índia em Portugal.  

O aspeto que deveria ter agitado o establishment diplomático português ao permitir que o primeiro-ministro português seja reconhecido como OCI é deixar a Índia determinar a natureza das relações diplomáticas entre os dois países. A Índia reivindicou Costa, um homem que se tornou primeiro-ministro sem qualquer apoio do Estado Indiano, e desta maneira definiu a identidade do mais alto representante de um Estado estrangeiro.

É óbvio que a Índia atingiu este objectivo em parte devido ao apoio das estruturas racializadas que continuam a dominar a cena internacional e onde Portugal, apesar de ser um membro da UE, continua a ser um país semi-periférico. Por estas razões, a relação entre os dois países está longe de ser uma interacção entre iguais, tendo a Índia uma larga vantagem. É compreensível que num contexto de dificuldades económicas graves os empresários portugueses lutem por acesso ao mercado indiano. Porém, o Governo português deveria ponderar se para isto valerá a pena comprometer a dignidade do Estado e, mais importante ainda, os direitos dos seus cidadãos.

A comprovar a astúcia do Estado Indiano, o estatuto de OCI não concede quaisquer direitos de cidadania de facto; trata-se, apenas, de um visto permanente. Na realidade, apesar de as únicas restrições conhecidas aos OCIs serem apenas as proibições de votar e a compra de propriedade agrícola, vários incidentes demonstram que existem diversas outras restrições ocultas, apenas referidas quando da conveniência do Estado indiano. O maior problema, contudo, reside no facto de o regime de OCI se basear em preconceitos raciais e sectários. (Sendo racismo a identificação de grupos de indivíduos como uma raça, grupo étnico ou religioso e a atribuição de características indeléveis a estes mesmos grupos). Desde logo, porque reforça o preconceito anti-muçulmano do Estado indiano, visto que o OCI não é extensível a pessoas com ligações familiares ao Paquistão e ao Bangladesh. Mais, com a actual política de OCI, a Índia define efectivamente os seus cidadãos através de uma perspectiva étnico-racial em vez de uma perspectiva legal. Por exemplo, os antepassados de Costa nunca foram indianos. Eram cidadãos portugueses e goeses, sendo que o Estado indiano só emergiu em 1947. Identificar os antepassados de Costa como indianos seria classifica-los do ponto de vista racial. Desta forma, o Estado indiano pretende revindicar como indiano qualquer pessoa que provenha do subcontinente em qualquer altura da história, apagando desta maneira todas as especificidades das diversas identidades sul-asiáticas e agrupando-as numa homogénea e racializada “identidade Indiana”. Isto ao mesmo tempo que pretende consolidar um nacionalismo cultural bramânico que exclui indivíduos que não pertencem às castas dominantes hindus e ignorando deliberadamente os direitos políticos de uma grande parte da população e de uma forma profundamente sectária.

Assim, quando Costa se afirma orgulhoso da sua identidade indiana, o que está efectivamente a fazer é ser cúmplice de um regime racialista e neo-colonial. Uma acção que tem consequências múltiplas, não só na Índia, mas também em Portugal.

Desde logo, esta postura do Governo de Portugal compromete a identidade dos seus cidadãos com ligações ao Sul da Ásia que se ressentem ao ser identificados como “indianos”. Este rótulo opera efectivamente de forma racialista, pois não só nega a esses cidadãos a sua identidade portuguesa como também ignora as especificidades das suas múltiplas identidades sociais. Esse é o caso dos vários grupos cujos antepassados deixaram o Gujarate e se estabeleceram na África portuguesa durante gerações, chegando a Portugal como retornados e portugueses. A mesma questão se coloca com os goeses, damanenses e diuenses. Para estas pessoas seria crucial poderem ser reconhecidas socialmente como portugueses — embora distinguindo as suas identidades sociais específicas — em vez de serem agrupados indiferenciadamente numa categoria racial única. Esperava-se que o corpo diplomático português que aconselha o primeiro-ministro tivesse sido capaz de tomar devida nota destas nuances sociais.

Mas a natureza racializada das relações luso-indianas não termina com a manipulação da identidade de Costa por parte da Índia. Portugal tem tido também um papel ativo neste jogo, perpetuando uma tradição colonial e luso-tropicalista, ao oferecer o seu “privilegiado entendimento” de África aos seus potenciais parceiros indianos, sabendo que a presença indiana em África tem dimensões neo-coloniais.

A escolha de um modus operandi mais ético na sua relação com a Índia, ao mesmo tempo enfrentando os complexos problemas que ensombram esta relação, daria a Portugal base para um entendimento mais honesto e possivelmente mais duradouro entre os dois países.

Um dos obstáculos a uma feliz convivência entre os dois países é sem dúvida a relação de Portugal com os seus antigos territórios no subcontinente, especialmente Goa. Esta difícil relação deve-se em grande parte aos distúrbios criados por parte de nacionalistas hindus ativos em Goa. É frequente ouvir-se os diplomatas portugueses na Índia mencionarem em privado que historicamente a razão para a ineficácia das relações entre Portugal e a Índia se deve ao Governo de Goa e a certos segmentos da sociedade local. Segundo os mesmos, as relações com o governo central são, pelo contrário, de grande cordialidade. Esta lógica poderá ter sido uma das razões que levou a diplomacia portuguesa a querer fundar uma nova relação com a Índia, pondo de lado as raízes do passado. Operando como Estado astuto, o governo central indiano reivindica completa impotência perante eventos “anti-portugueses” em Goa, precisamente por não ter nenhum interesse em pôr fim a este tipo de manifestações naquele território. Isto porque a retórica dos nacionalistas hindus em Goa não é mais do que uma extensão lógica do nacionalismo cultural através do qual a Índia continua a impor uma certa identidade nacional.

Pelo facto de assentar num nacionalismo cultural, em lugar de num nacionalismo político, a construção da identidade nacional indiana sempre foi marcada por ideias de inimigos externos e internos. Por esta razão, também, a presença portuguesa será sempre vista com suspeita, e a história portuguesa no subcontinente sempre disponível para ser recordada de acordo com a conveniência dos interlocutores e a obvia desvantagem dos investidores portugueses na Índia. Dado o poder que o governo central indiano tem sobre os seus estados, especialmente quando o mesmo partido governa tanto a nível nacional como regional, a invariável alegação de impotência para intervir na situação de Goa deve ser vista com grande cepticismo. Desempenhando o papel de Estado astuto, a Índia permite e incentiva o florescimento de alguma instabilidade regional, porque a mesma lhe traz vantagens na sua estratégia geo-política mais alargada.

Uma política externa que reconheça a natureza do Estado indiano permitiria a Portugal perceber que abandonar o passado português no subcontinente nunca poderá gerar uma relação madura e equitativa com a Índia. Na verdade, é no confronto das questões relacionadas com o fim do Estado da Índia Portuguesa, como a maneira em que o Estado indiano nega aos residentes destes antigos territórios a dupla nacionalidade, que Portugal poderá construir uma relação honesta com a Índia, cumprir com as suas obrigações enquanto descolonizador, confrontar os seus desejos neo-colonialistas que ensombram a sua relação com os PALOP e, ao mesmo tempo, enfrentar os complexos desafios raciais que estão longe de estar resolvidos em Portugal.

(Este post foi publicado como Opinião no Publico no 5 Jan 2018)

On Vandalizations and the Rule of Law

Through the month of July, Catholics in Goa were under considerable distress following a spate of vandalizations both of crosses as well as grave stones. For a while the state seemed unable to address the situation until the police identified one Francis Pereira as the perpetrator of these acts. However, if the state authorities were under the impression that this arrest would satisfy civil society in Goa, then they were sadly mistaken. Incredulous that a fifty-year-old man could single-handedly engage in so much destruction, the arrest has become the butt of jokes and caustic comment from Goan citizens.

While the state may continue to protest its bona fides and swear that they have gotten the right man, it would do well for the authorities to take stock of the situation they find themselves in where the citizenry is deeply suspicious of them. This is at least the second instance where the citizenry have refused to accept the police’s version of events. The other incident that I refer to is that of the nature of Fr. Bismarque Dias’s mysterious death. The state authorities should realise that if this popular disregard of their findings becomes a systematic pattern, then not only will they lose the confidence of the people but it will seriously impact the law and order situation in the state. Indeed, if there is one single fear that we can take away from the grave vandalization case it is of the manner in which law and order has declined in Goa. Last month, this column reflected on the instance in the village of Mercês where rather than complain to the police, locals had taken it on themselves to avenge their abuse by rowdy tourists.

The Government on the other hand seems to not take this situation where the authorities are being increasingly disregarded seriously enough. As with most things the authorities seem to have grasped the wrong end of the stick with what law and order means. While the state should be concerned with preventing crimes like the vandalization of graves, they are instead busy building up a police, or surveillance state. Thus, rather than work to ensure that the peace of society is not disturbed, they sit back and allow for provocative rhetoric to fill the air – as in the case of the recently-concluded All India Hindu Convention. Once violence erupts, the authorities delightedly step in to augment the existence of a state with greater police surveillance. Civil society should take note that a greater police presence in the state is not a panacea. Rather, the biased way in which police can function, especially when the state is under the control of problematic forces should give one pause when considering, or demanding, greater police presence on the streets. Take, for example, the actions of police forces where they have stood by silently, or joined in the violence when Muslims are attacked by Hindu mobs. This was the case not just in Gujarat in 2002, but in various cases across India. Indeed, one was witness to such a scenario in Goa itself when I 2002 police stood by while property in Fontainhas was vandalised by Hindu right wing groups.  

There is another question that emerges when civil society considers the question of the vandalizations.  In addition to demanding that the state ensure better security, another response has been to blame Hindu nationalist groups, in particular the forces behind the All India Hindu Convention. While there is no doubt that greater state scrutiny is required of the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, one should be careful to not blame the group for the violence without investigation. There are a plethora of Hindu nationalist groups, and not all of them are necessarily working with each other, even though they may all be working towards a common goal of a Hindu state. These groups are also working to undermine the strength of groups they see as being too soft, some groups demand deference because they have been around for longer are more established, and led by upper caste leaders. Thus, what is required is that, rather than wild allegations, we demand that a serious investigation be carried out by the state authorities and appropriate actions be taken. In this context, it falls on political parties that do not have representation in the legislature, but have ambitions of getting there, to take leadership. Political parties like the AAP or the Communists have funds and personnel and they ideally ought to direct these funds and personnel towards ensuring that the procedures and rule of law are followed. They should hire lawyers, and other professionals as needed, and ensure that there is a systematic follow-up. What I am arguing for, is that especially at a time when the rule of law, and the institutions that secure it, are collapsing we need to work harder to ensure that procedures are followed, and there is a firm focus on institution building.

What would be the appropriate response to these vandalizations? Catholics, and others concerned, should also be aware that these acts are possibly being carried out to gauge the responses of the public. If such is the case, responding with vigilante action would be devastating. Concerned groups need to do all they can to avoid emotional responses and insist that the state do its job. What we need at this point in time, where the state is actively abandoning its role as the upholder of law is to commit ourselves to a greater investment in institution building. What needs to be understood is that the Hindu right thrives precisely on the collapse of the secular state. We need to stem this collapse by a commitment to institution building and a respect for the due process of law.

(A version of this post was first published in the O Heraldo on 25 July 2017)

Why don’t you see Fascism?

The bye-elections to select the representative for the city of Panjim are being seen as critical given that it will determine if the BJP-led coalition will continue to govern Goa, and will also determine the career of the BJP candidate Manohar Parrikar. It is for this reason, therefore, that most people are on edge and apprehensive about the outcome. Some of the tensions involved in this election were made evident in the article written by advocate F. E. Noronha and published in Renovação, the newsletter and magazine of the Archdiocese of Goa. In this article, Noronha all but urged the electorate to reject Parrikar at the polls, arguing that a Nazi-like atmosphere had arisen in Goa.

A newspaper article reported that Vijay Sardesai, leader of the Goa Forward party which is a member of the ruling coalition, dismissed this article as “hyperbole”. Sardesai is reported to have indicated that he thought the argument “a clear cut case of exaggeration. In Goa, where is the fascism? Which community is being discriminated or acted against by the state, through the state machinery?”

This report confirmed my own evaluation of the problems with the Indian polity, and the inability of elected representatives and politicians to either appreciate the nature of what exactly is at stake at this particular moment in Indian politics, or to ignore the implications in their drive to obtain political power.

To begin with is the sheer arrogance with which Sardesai dismisses Noronha’s argument. As a member of a Hindu dominant caste, Sardesai is in no position to idly dismiss others’ concerns.  How would he, who is under no threat - of life, or culture - be able to determine what is hyperbole or not? Rather than dismissing the concerns of a member of a minoritized group, he ought to have said, “yes, I hear you, and I will see what I can do to resolve this matter”. This dismissal is particularly callous given that Sardesai rose to power through the support of the many Catholic groups. 

It appears that Sardesai has either no idea how fascism actually operates, or is being disingenuous given that he has pledged his support to Manohar Parrikar’s election bid from Panjim. In any case, since Sardesai reportedly inquired which community is being discriminated against by the State, let us take him seriously and provide a response. This response will demonstrate the manner in which fascism has been growing, systematically pushing groups out of power and minoritizing them.

It needs to be noted that fascism does not emerge fully-grown, like some Athena from the head of Zeus. On the contrary, fascism grows through small, deliberate steps. One need only look at the discrimination against the Roman script of the Konkani language. Ever since 1981, when the Official Language Act (OLA) was legislated by the Congress party, the Roman script has been the target of hostility by the state-supported Nagri Konkani lobby. Not only have literary works in the Roman script been ignored for awards, these works have not even been admitted to competitions on the grounds that the Roman script is not an officially recognised script. This is the face of creeping fascism where the chief tool through which a social group, viz. that of the Bahujan Catholics, expresses itself is systematically and deliberately side-lined and suffocated. Indeed, given Sardesai’s claims of representing Goemkarponn, or Goanness, one would have expected him to take up the long-standing demand of such groups as the Dalgado Konknni Akademi, and the Romi Lipi Action Front to ensure that the Roman script is officially recognised. But this is not the only example of systematic minoritization and threat. There has been a stream of anti-Catholic abuse by persons not just from outside of Goa, like Sadhvi Saraswati, but persons within Goa such as Subash Velingkar, Uday Bhembre, with people like Naguesh Karmali having actually participated in the destruction of property as in Fontainhas in 2002. In all of these events, state governments of varying parties have literally looked on passively. One should also not forget the effective suffocation of the production of beef in the state a process initiated by the MGP in 1978.

One would have hoped that Sardesai would use his position in the ruling coalition to push forward agendas, like the official recognition of the Roman script, that will halt the systematic minoritization of various groups within Goa. However, Sardesai’s rhetoric demonstrates a troubling similarity with Hindu nationalists. Take, for example, that not only has Sardesai reportedly dismissed Noronha’s argument as hyperbole he has also dismissed “certain sections of Goan people” as being irrational. He suggests that such concerns are the result of “scepticism, pessimism among certain sections of Goan people” rather than rational opinion articulated after careful study and observation. Given that these comments were made in the context of Noronha’s article, one can safely assume that Sardesai means Catholics when he refers to “certain sections of Goan people.”

As should be obvious from the discussion above, fascism in our state is not limited to the actions of the BJP alone. Rather, it has had a long gestation period. Nevertheless, it is also true that the presence of the BJP, especially at the Centre, has allowed for the animosity towards non-Hindu groups to be asserted viciously. In this context we should take into consideration the words of the economist and former finance minister of Greece, Yanis Varoufakis. Speaking in the context of the recently concluded French presidential elections Varoufakis pointed out that it was important to rally around the problematic figure of Emmanuel Macron precisely because it was critical that the racist and right-wing Marie Le Pen be defeated. Speaking to those who did not see a difference between these two problematic figures he pointed out that one needed to be aware of the implications of what happens when a “fascist, racist party” gets its “hands on the levers of the deep state, the levers of the police, and of the army.” This article will appear too late for it to have any impact on the outcome of the election to the Panjim legislatve seat. However, the larger point that needs to be made is to underline how fascism operates, and how it is, in fact, very much a threat in Goa.

(A version of this text was first published in the O Heraldo on 24 Aug 2017)

Mercês, stereotypes and the broken system

A violent altercation in the village of Mercês between a busload of tourists from Maharashtra and about four residents of the village caused a stir across Goa.

There were a number of reasons why this incident garnered the attention it did. First was that the incident involved the use not merely of brute force, but of weapons including a sword, chopper and a club. Then there was the scale of the violence. The bus utilized by the tourists was also set upon by this group resulting in smashed windows and the like. And finally, as reported by the press, was the fact that it was not just men who were attacked but women and children as well.

What is interesting is that the site of the incident was considered a significant detail in the debates within Goa. As was obvious in discussions on social media, the residents of Mercês and the surrounding villages are said to be known for their violent behavior and their “goondaism”. In other words, the location was a confirmation of the guilt of the accused and the innocence of the tourists. Initial reports suggested that the four residents attacked the group of tourists over a petty incident. As it turns out, however, the tourists may not have been particularly innocent given that CCTV footage from the restaurant suggest that it was the tourists who began the altercation.

The focus on the residential identity of the perpetrators of this crime, and the manner in which the tourists were presented as innocent, demonstrates the processes of political injustice in our state. The people of Mercês and surrounding villages, just as the people of Salcete, are routinely held up as examples of rowdy and violent political behavior. Echoing the arguments of Vivek Dhareshwar and R. Srivatsan in their essay on the ‘rowdy-sheeter’, I would like to point out that the identification of the residents of these areas as rowdy elements is not innocent. Rather, it is deeply rooted in their caste, class, and religious identity. The residents of these villages tend to Catholics, not from brahmanised Catholic caste groups, former tenants of large landlords, and members of the working class. The tension in Goan politics since at least the ‘80s has been to harness the energy of these groups and make them serve the agendas of the elites, as in the case of the pro-Nagari Konkani language movement. The moment they disagree with elite opinions and seek to assert themselves, they are branded as rowdy.

The systematic and persistent denial of a voice in the formal institutions of democracy, and by extension a denigration of the rule of law ensures a rise in violent forms of protest and vigilante justice. Indeed, the incident in Mercês also assumes significance because vigilante (in)justice has come to dominate the Indian political scene. Whether it is lynching persons who are presumed to be transporting cows for slaughter, or persons who are innocent bystanders, vigilante actions seem to be a rising trend in the country.

Whether in the case of the incident in Mercês, or instances across India, vigilante actions can be traced to the fact that there is in fact a systematic destruction of institutions of law and order in the country. While the silence of the Prime Minister, and the active choices that the BJP seems to be making in nominating leaders definitely seems to have opened the flood gates of unlawful violence, it needs to be emphasized that the undermining of the institutions of justice delivery has been ongoing for decades. For example, had there been a firm commitment to the rule of law in our state, the initial altercation begun by the tourists would have been reported to the police. The locals would not have been toughs, and nor would they have taken the law into their own hands. People are encouraged to take the law into their own hands primarily because they see the organs of the state as unreliable in resolving violence, or complicit in violence.

My argument is buttressed by the fact that our Chief Minister has himself pointed to the possibility of a police-goonda nexus in the Mercês incident, only underlining the fact that the police are seen as an ineffective organ of justice delivery.Left unarticulated, however, is that the intervention of elected representatives in the functioning of the police systemis another one of the reasons for this perceived ineffectiveness. In addition to the possible police-goonda nexus, one also has the police-politician nexus, as suspected in so many cases, not least that of the rape and murder of Scarlett Keeling.

But it is not just politicians who are to blame; as many have remarked Goan society suffers from a profound lack of morality. Thus, whether politicians are the cause or the effect, the fact is that Goan society shamelessly indulges in immorality. Take, for example, the fact that a response of many Goans to the incident was that this incident would give a “further beating” to “Goa’s reputation as a tourist-friendly State”. If on the one hand the tourist in Goa is seen as an object to be used for the generation of money alone; on the other hand, under the guise of ensuring law and order the tourist is also often used as a way to destroy the guarantee of legal rights. Take, for instance, the way in which rather than address the larger issue with regard to public transport in the state, civil society groups seek to crush the taxi driver unions using the tired argument of the damage to the tourist trade. One is not concerned about rights, neither of the local, nor of the tourist. At the end of the day this cynical use of tourism only serves to further hollow out societal morality.

In various interventions in the press I have consistently pointed out that rather than being merely one way through which Goans earn money, tourism has become the raison d’etre of our existence. It is as if we exist, and Goa exists, merely to service tourists. Rather than addressing the question of rights, the issue becomes one of the impact on tourism. Even the issue of beef ban evokes responses that claim that the tourism industry will be affected. Rarely are the rights of locals to choose their diet, mentioned when criticizing the ban. The incident in Mercês should concern us not because the victims in this case were tourists, but because this incident is a demonstration of a breakdown of law and order, where both state and society systematically ignore the question of rights and justice, and people believe it is acceptable to take law into their own hands.

(A version of this post was first published in the O Heraldo on 27 June 2017)

The Ambiguous Aid of the Goan Taxista

Ever so often public ire in Goa turns against the Goan taxi-drivers who are seen, at least by certain dominant sections, as the single group that is upsetting the order in Goa. The taxistas, and in particular the taxistas of Salcete, have been accused of refusing to accede to a regime of digital meters and proper fare charts, charging exorbitant amounts in the absence of these standards. Additionally, if the clients ask for details of the fare calculation, they are allegedly often abused or threatened. These men are seen as uncouth, unreasonable, prone to violent protest.  A number of concerned voices were recently raised when the taxi drivers blocked the entry of the transportation network companies, like Uber and Ola, into the local market. These voices pointed out that such behaviour was in fact enforcing a monopoly, and thanks to the uncouth and violent behaviour of the taxistas would in fact result that a tourist’s first impression of Goa was a negative one. This could only result in the decline of tourists to Goa and the killing of one of the most lucrative industries that the state enjoys.

In this column I will not justify as much as frame their actions in a different light. First, I will try to suggest that their actions are not, in fact, different from many players in the Goan economy, and secondly, that their actions may in fact be beneficial to our larger interests.

In economics and in public-choice theory, the kind of behaviour ascribed to the taxistas is described as ‘rent-seeking’; which involves seeking to increase one's share of existing wealth without creating new wealth. To understand this term we need to distinguish it from the understanding of profit-seeking behaviour. Profit results from the extraction of value when two parties engaging in mutually beneficial transactions. While the party paying the profit may grumble about the price for the commodity, s/he still engages in the transaction because the gain is still more than the value extracted as profit by the vendor. In the case of rent-seeking behaviour, however, one is manipulating the social or political environment in which economic activities occur, rather than creating new wealth. A classic example provided for rent-seeking behaviour is that of the feudal lord who installs a chain across a river and then hires a collector to charge passing boats a fee to lower the chain. There is nothing productive about the chain or the collector. The lord has made no improvements to the river and is helping nobody in any way, directly or indirectly, except himself. All he is doing is finding a way to make money from something that used to be free. Another example of rent-seeking behaviour, and this one would be closer to what the taxistas of Goa are engaging in, is to gain a coercive monopoly to enjoy advantages in the market while imposing disadvantages on other competitors. Rent-seeking results imperils the economy because it results in reduced economic efficiency through poor allocation of resources, reduced actual wealth creation, lost government revenue, increased income inequality, thus potential all-round decline of the economy.

As upsetting as the taxistas actions may be, are they the only sector of the Goan economy who behave in this way? Critics of the mining sector in Goa would argue that mining in Goa is also based on rent-seeking. The miners are known to cheat on the payment of taxes, depriving the exchequer valuable funds through which income could be invested in public infrastructure. This critique is most strongly made by the members of the Goenchi Mati Movement, who now demand changes in the way that mining in Goa is run so that rent-seeking behaviour can shift to profit-seeking behaviour, and the profit can be spread more equitably across society and across generations.

A similar inquiry could also be levelled against the tourism industry; are the many shacks, hotels, and more recently casinos, engaging in value addition, or are they merely skimming of the natural beauty of Goa, and the captive markets that they have thus far enjoyed? The behaviour of political leaders who allegedly use their office as a way to extract money from the entire system is similarly rent-seeking. It is reported that for a sum, politicians intervene to give people jobs. They are also known to use their location to ensure kickbacks and gain huge profits, which are then invested in real estate – which is in fact a destruction of productive fields, and a destruction of the ecological order. Indeed, the rent-seeking nature of the actors in the Goan economy is pretty much the focus of Raghuraman Trichur’s book Refiguring Goa.

If rent-seeking is a feature of practically the entire Goan economy, why is it that it is only the taxistas who bear the brunt of seemingly unanimous condemnation? Is it because they are largely former tenants who in earlier times would bear the brunt of the rent-seeking behaviour of their landlords? Indeed, one could argue that the violent responses of the taxistas of Salcete is the result of the centuries of brutally unequal relations that have marked that territory.

But it is not like the taxistas of Goa are the only ones protesting the transportation network companies. Since at least 2014 taxi drivers across Europe have protested against the entry of the global transportation network company Uber. They make valid claims that companies like Uber make money out of the fact that there is as yet no regulation covering them, while the taxi drivers are covered by a variety of legislation. Transportation network companies are in this respect not dissimilar to the plethora of other companies, for example, online marketplace and hospitality services like Airbnb, who also operate without the burden of the regulations that govern the hospitality industry.

While these new age companies operate under the façade of such terms as “shared economy”, in truth they are the vanguard of the neo-liberal economy that thrives on destroying public infrastructure and institutions, and then extracting rent from the helpless consumer. One need only look at the surge pricing that transportation network companies extract. While these companies initially enter the market with lower prices, and undercut regular taxi services, when there is an increased demand they jack up their prices astronomically.  All of this while the company does not provide security to the drivers who associate with the company. This is, to be sure, the future of transportation network companies. They are not here to help, there are here to exploit.

To this extent, as much as the actions of the Goan taxistas are problematic, they are no different from the actions of the rest of the economy. Further, to the extent that they have blocked some neo-liberal players from entering the economy, they may in fact be doing us a service in that they are delaying the final assault of neo-liberalism on our economies.

(A version of this post was first published in the O Heraldo on 4 April 2017)