For those who heaved a sigh of
relief at the news of the death of Bal Thackeray, the response to his death was
deeply agitating. Not merely politicians, but it appears the big names of
Bollywood and sundry journalists seemed to be bend over backwards to pay
compliments to a man who while doubtlessly a significant leader to members and
partisans of the Shiv Sena, was responsible for much death and violence (not
merely physical and material but discursive violence as well) in Bombay city
and across those spaces in the country where his rhetoric had appeal. Of this
violence, there has been not so much as a whisper in these accolades. It was
pretty much in this vein that Nandakumar Kamat’s response in the Navhind Times
to Thackeray’s death was crafted.
To a large extent, the writings
of Nandakumar Kamat represent the perspective of the educated middle class
segments of our society that imagine themselves to be secular. There are a
number of interesting blindspots to their secularism however, that indicate the
troubled nature of their commitment to, or understanding of, this virtue of
contemporary democracy. It is for this reason that Kamat’s scripting of “Why Maharashtra Loved Bal Thackeray” needs to be reviewed.
Kamat’s eulogy to Thackeray, and
let us make no mistake that his article is a eulogy, begins with an interesting
insight into Kamat’s understanding of democracy. While a large number of
Bomaicars were quite agitated by the decision to hold Thackeray’s cremation in
Shivaji Park, Kamat justifies this decision by suggestion that the Chief
Minister of Maharashtra, Prithviraj Chavan “was just bowing to the wishes of
the people.” Kamat is clearly indicating here, his understanding of democracy,
not as the rule of law over all people, or of democracy as the system that
ensures the protection of the minority, but of democracy as majoritarian rule. This
fascistic edge to Kamat’s eulogy unfortunately only deepens when he then goes
on to evaluate Thackeray’s success in terms of his apparent appeal to the
“grass-roots.” Masses and majority, these are two critical elements of fascism
and there is not so much as a whimper of disagreement in Kamat’s essay.
In his eulogy, Kamat makes but a
coy reference to Thackeray’s politics of intimidation and violence. He suggests
that these politics were “basically the fear of demographic and cultural dilution
followed by economic and political marginalization which creates a regional
backlash in any state.” Thus Kamat is suggesting that the violent actions of
the Shiv Sena were the result of the Maharashtrian inhabitants, who have first
dibs on the city, feeling marginalized. Indeed this sugar-coating of a deeply
problematic man’s poisonous, and avoidable legacy is carried further when Kamat
suggests that Thackeray was a hero because he was able to, speaking “from his
heart” give space for the Marathi middle class “looking for some respect,
identity and recognition” a sense of “Maharashtrian cultural pride”.
Kamat has gotten his facts
grievously mixed up however. He forgets that the borders of contemporary
Maharashtra were forged recently, in 1960, as a result of the reorganization of
the Bombay state into the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Prior to this
there were cultural boundaries to Marathi territory, and unlike other parts of
contemporary Maharashtra that could possibly claim a unchallenged
identification with just one language, the city of Bombay was never a part of
this wholly Maharashtrian cultural community. The city of Bombay forged its own
cultural space, being the home of the East Indians, Parsis, Gujaratis (who in
1960 even claimed Bombay for their own state), Goans, Italians, Arabs,
Persians, Britishers and of course the Portuguese, to name just a few. If today
Bombay can be unproblematicaly be seen as Maharashtrian territory, it is
because Thackeray was able to, subsequent to the 1960 inclusion of Bombay city
as a part of the State of Maharashtra, craft Bombay as an exclusively Maharashtrian
city through his politics of violence. Indeed, the Maratha and Marathi, were
and are, as much migrants to the city of Bombay as any of the other groups that
Kamat so condescendingly dismisses as “non Marathi migrants in Mumbai who have
made the megapolis their permanent home.”
I would argue that Kamat gets his
facts mixed up because he looks at the issue from another fascistic
perspective, which is to see the world as naturally composed of monolithic
cultural communities born when language and territory overlap. In the present
case it could be Maharashtra and Marathi, but it could just as well be Goa and
Konkani. It is because Kamat is sympathetic to this parochial (mildly racist
even) view of the world, that he is able to make sense of, and justify, Thackeray’s
politics. It is for this reason that Kamat does not see the complex history of
Bombay, and restricts himself only to Maharashtrian history from “original
Marathi sources” when attempting to understand and put forth the case of
Balasaheb Thackeray.
There is no doubt that Balasaheb
Thackeray was able to capitalize on the angst of the Marathi Hindu middle-class
and dominant caste groups. However we have to be able to see that these groups
do not, nor did they necessarily ever, have any primary right to the city of
Bombay, nor indeed in the rest of Maharashtra (in the latter case they would
have to necessarily share space with non-dominant caste groups). In the case of
Bombay city, the Marathi migrants were merely one more set of migrants that
through a stroke of fate gained dubious claim to first dibs on the city in the
state carved out on racist lines. Further, we have to recognize that
Thackeray’s politics of violence, is not the only way to deal with the “fear of
demographic and cultural dilution” and “economic and political marginalization”
that Kamat refers to. Indeed, Kamat himself points to the fact that Thackeray
was vociferously against the democratic strategies that seek to negotiate
economic and cultural marginalization outlined in the Mandal Commission Report.
The last issue that needs to be
addressed in Kamat’s eulogy is his muffling of the strident Hindu nationalism
that lay at the core of Thackeray’s rhetoric.
It is perhaps in this realm that the problematic nature of Kamat’s
secularism comes across. Rather than acknowledge that there is a profound problem
with Hindu nationalism, he seems to join those “secular” nationalist who seek
to justify all but the most violent of Hindutva’s manifestations. Thus, Veer
Savarkar, the possible mastermind of the Gandhi assassination, and leader of
the Hindu Right, is presented merely as a “great Hindu nationalist and
reformer”. There is also something of a dismissal of those who aware of
Thackeray and the Shiv Sena’s Hindu nationalist history saw in the huge turnout
at the funeral a “Hindu backlash”. More sophisticated social science research
points out that conscious action is not everything. Groups very often
unconsciously follow patterns that have been established. Thus there need not
have to be a conscious effort to demonstrate Hindu power, Thackeray and the
Shiv Sena spent decades making sure their every action was justified in terms
of the rightful assertion of Hindu power. Furthermore, the stories of the
forcible shutting down of shops, of extra-legal curfews policed by youth
carrying saffron flags speak volumes about the death of Thackeray being used as
one more example of the assertion of Hindu power. Kamat’s silence on this front and his
muffling of the strident Hindu nationalist positions of the Shiv Sena are
deeply disturbing. They are disturbing because of one, or a combination of
three possible reasons; he does not see Hindu nationalism as problematic, he is
unaware of that Hindu nationalist violence is possible because of the silence
which routinely greets it, or because it is assumed to be the work of lumpen
lower class Hindu elements that can easily be held in check by upper-caste
leaders. All three are profoundly erroneous.
Kamat’s eulogy to Bal Thackeray
is deeply troubling because it indicated an acceptance of political violence
directed by authoritarian leaders directing mobs, where rights seem to belong
first to the people of the land, and then to those persons labeled as migrants.
These migrants could be randomly defined on the basis of religion, language,
caste or territory. These are signs of merely a superficial commitment to
democracy and secularism. Bal Thackeray may have passed on, but his legacy it
appears, may still linger on.
Goans should read essays such as "Why Maharashtra Loved Bal Thackeray" only with the greatest of circumspection. This is because, in the light of the demands for 'Special Status' such essays are softening up the public opinion for the kind of horrendous changes that Bal Thackeray wrought on Bombay. A good many Goans may believe that they are being marginalized in their own land, but the Thackeray route is not solution, since it will not address the needs of the truly marginalized within Goa, and it will be built on a Hindu majoritarianism, cleverly disguised as was the result of the Konkani language movement. No, Bal Thackeray, and Special Status, despite what many fondly believe, are not the response to Goa's challenges.